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1. Introduction
1
The selection of the founder members of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
constitutes a momentous step in the history of European monetary integration.  While
the participants have been decided upon, there still remains a number of important
questions on how EMU will work in practice.  This article considers how monetary
policy may be conducted within EMU, focusing on the main strategies under
consideration.
Monetary policy in the euro currency area will be formulated and implemented by the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), comprising the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the National Central Banks (NCBs).  The ECB will come into existence at
the start of July 1998, replacing its forerunner the European Monetary Institute (EMI).
The ESCB has been mandated by the Maastricht Treaty to ensure price stability
2 within
the euro area.  This narrowly defined objective is protected from political interference
by statutes based on an international treaty which only member states acting
collectively can alter.  This confers the ESCB with a high level of independence in the
pursuit of its objective.  However, the Treaty also states that “without prejudice to the
objective of price stability, it shall support the general economic policies in the
Community”.  Given that the newly formed ESCB will have no track record in the
fulfilment of its price stability objective, it is imperative that credibility is established at
                                               
1 The authors would like to acknowledge helpful comments by Michael Casey and Peter Charleton.
2 Price stability is selected as an objective since it is considered to be an important factor in achieving
a high and rising level of living standards.2
the start of EMU.  The ESCB will have to choose the monetary policy strategy that
will best deliver the credibility required.
3
This article presents a framework for monetary policy in which the various monetary
strategies available to the ESCB can be assessed.  The main focus is on the candidate
strategies recommended by the EMI - monetary aggregate targeting or direct inflation
targeting or some combination of both.  The agreed instruments and procedures that
form part of the tactical toolkit of the ESCB are examined within the context of these
strategies.  In the next section the various monetary strategies available for the euro
area are reviewed.  Section 3 considers the options available to the ESCB in combining
elements of both candidate strategies.  The implementation issues which arise are
considered in Section 4.  The final section presents some tentative conclusions.
2. The Choice of Monetary Strategies
The start of EMU will constitute a substantial regime shift for monetary policy
formulation in the EU.  As a trading block, the euro area will be relatively closed in
contrast to the structure of its participant countries, while internationally it will be of a
comparable size to the USA.  These constitute important factors in deciding upon a
strategy for monetary policy within EMU.
A suitable strategy for monetary policy should satisfy a number of criteria (EMI,
1997a).  The strategy should be effective in meeting the objective of price stability; the
                                               
3 The actions of the ESCB need to be credible in order to convince the public that the price stability
objective will be met.  Otherwise, the public will anticipate inflation in their setting of prices and
wages so fulfilling their expectations of rising prices.3
processes of setting targets and decision making should be transparent to the public;
the formulation and communication of the targets should be such as to hold the
monetary authority accountable to the public for its actions; it should have a medium-
term focus to lock-in inflationary expectations, while retaining some discretion in
responding to short-run deviations from the target; as far as possible there should be
continuity with the experiences of the strategies used by the participating NCBs and
finally it should be consistent with the independence
4 of the ESCB.
As the stylised representation in Figure 1 outlines, the ultimate target of each strategy
is price stability.
5  However, in order to pursue this objective an intermediate target
and/or indicator is utilised.
6  Intermediate targets for monetary policy are required due
to the uncertainty that arises between the use of monetary policy instruments and the
ensuing effectiveness in achieving the objective of price stability.  This uncertainty
results from the long lags and complexity in the transmission of policy actions and the
resultant impact on inflation.  In addition, intermediate targets can both guide the
policy decisions of the monetary authority and facilitate the communication of policy
actions to the public.
                                               
4 In addition to independence from political influence, monetary authorities should also assert their
autonomy with respect to financial markets.  As Blinder (1998) argues, following financial markets
too closely can “lead the central bank to inherit precisely the short-term horizon that central bank
independence is meant to prevent”.
5 Price stability literally means no change in prices which implies a zero inflation rate.  However, it
has been found internationally that the true rate of inflation is below the measured rate in many
countries (see for example, Boskin et al., 1997).  This suggests that an inflation rate of zero would
imply price deflation, hence a rate somewhere between 0-2% would be considered broadly consistent
with price stability.
6 An intermediate target is a variable that policymakers choose to focus on when the ultimate target is
difficult to monitor and control by contemporaneous policy actions.  Indicators are variables that
provide information on current or future behaviour of the objectives.4
The EMI considered five possible strategies for monetary policy within EMU.  These
strategies were interest rate targeting, nominal income targeting, exchange rate
targeting, monetary aggregate targeting and direct inflation targeting (EMI, 1997a).
7
2.1 Interest rate targeting
An interest rate targeting strategy involves the use of a short-term interest rate as an
intermediate target for monetary policy.  Since the short-term interest rate is the
primary operating target
8 used by most monetary authorities, changes in this variable
can be instantaneously and accurately measured.  However, it is the real, or inflation
adjusted, rate of interest which is of most relevance to economic decision making.
Given the difficulties which arise in the identification of an equilibrium real interest rate
                                               
7 For a review of the candidate monetary strategies in the euro area, see Devine and McCoy (1998a).
8 An operating target is the variable or instrument that policy-makers try to control in order to achieve
an intermediate target.


































consistent with price stability, the effectiveness of such a strategy is reduced.  Hence,
the targeting of interest rates is generally considered to be inappropriate by the EMI
and is not being proposed as a monetary strategy in the euro area.
2.2 Exchange rate targeting
The exchange rate  has been a commonly used target variable, notably among the
smaller EU countries within the ERM.  The pegging of the exchange rate to an anchor
country with a strong reputation for price stability and with which the country has
strong economic links is considered particularly appropriate for a small open economy.
The main attributes of this strategy are that exchange rates are accurately and
immediately measured; they are widely understood by the public; they respond almost
immediately to changes in the operating target, which is usually the interest rate, and
they have a broad impact on the economy.  However, in the context of EMU,  this
strategy is not considered suitable given the size and international importance of the
new euro area and the extent of intra currency-area trade.
2.3 Nominal income targeting
The use of a nominal income, or GDP, target has been advocated to address the
concern that focusing solely on price stability may be at the expense of output
stabilisation in the short-run.  However, a nominal income target is difficult to measure
and control since estimates of income growth can be imprecise and prone to change
over time.  Furthermore, political complications may arise if the announced target is
perceived to be too low in which case the monetary authority may be accused of being
‘anti-growth’.  Finally there is a danger that a nominal income target may be6
misinterpreted as the ultimate goal of the ESCB, whereas the primary objective is the
maintenance of  price stability.
The EMI, using the general principles set out above, decided that interest rate targets,
exchange rate targets and nominal income targets were inappropriate for the purpose
of a monetary strategy for the ESCB.  The choice of strategy has been narrowed down
to monetary aggregate targeting or direct inflation targeting.  As will be discussed in
the next section, a consensus seems to be emerging that a combination of both these
strategies will be used, given their similarities in practice. However, in theory the
differences between monetary aggregate targeting and inflation targeting are
considerable.
2.4 Monetary aggregate targeting
Under monetary aggregate targeting, the monetary authority targets the supply of a
monetary aggregate, usually a broad measure of money which includes cash and bank
deposits.  The supply of the monetary aggregate is kept on a predetermined growth
path, based on the monetarist quantity theory of money, which states that inflation
arises from the growth in money.  The targeted growth in the monetary aggregate is
determined from estimates of real potential growth in the economy, any trend in the
velocity (turnover) of money and an inflation rate deemed consistent with the price
stability objective.
Traditionally monetary aggregate targets were perceived as ‘money rules’ which
served to increase the transparency of monetary policy and limit the discretion of the
monetary authority.  However, in the 1980s the process of financial innovation and the7
liberalisation of capital markets resulted in the disintegration of previously stable
relationships between money and prices.  As a result there has been a substantial shift
internationally away from the use of monetary aggregates as the sole focus of monetary
policy actions.
Monetary aggregate targeting has the advantage that it holds the monetary authority
accountable for liquidity growth, the variable that it presumably can exert most control
over.  However, this depends on the stability of the money demand relationship in the
euro area.  While recent studies
9 suggest that euro area-wide money demand functions
exhibit very satisfactory statistical properties in terms of stability, these results are not
conclusive.
10 The regime shift which will accompany the onset of EMU is likely to
weaken further the relationship between money and prices.
11
2.5 Inflation targeting
Inflation targeting in theory requires the central bank to set monetary conditions such
that activity levels in the economy are consistent with the price stability objective.
12  In
its purest form, direct inflation targeting has no intermediate target since the monetary
authority focuses on the ultimate target of inflation control.  However, in practice, the
monetary authority following this strategy has to adjust interest rates such that the
                                               
9 See, for example, Browne et al. (1997), Artis et al. (1993).
10 There is the possibility of ‘aggregation bias’ in these findings, where the sum of the money demand
functions has less volatility than its individual component parts, casting doubt on the applicability of
the econometric results obtained for a single money demand function for the euro area.
11 In addition to the regime shift, the adoption of the money supply as a target variable can in itself
lead to the breakdown of the predictable link between money and inflation. This is an example of
Goodhart’s Law.
12 For a detailed analysis of the issues relating to an inflation targeting strategy, see Devine and
McCoy (1998b).8
forecasted inflation rate, which becomes de facto an intermediate target, is in line with
the ultimate target of price stability.
13  In assessing the appropriate level of interest
rates, the monetary authority monitors all economic variables that influence inflation,
including the growth of money.  This contrasts with a monetary aggregate targeting
approach where the focus is limited to controlling the growth of money.
Inflation targets may be better in coping with structural changes since they do not rely
on a stable relationship between any specific economic indicator and inflation.  This
would be an advantage for the ESCB in the initial phase of EMU.  However, this
advantage may be undermined if the inflation objective is missed due to factors outside
the control of the ESCB thereby reducing its credibility.  For instance, price factors
such as those resulting from high national wage agreements or significant commodity
price changes.  In order to ensure credibility, an inflation targeting strategy requires
considerable analysis and explanation to ensure the necessary transparency of monetary
policy actions.  In particular, a detailed explanation of the transmission mechanism
between policy instrument changes and inflation is required.  In the broad monetary
union decided upon, the considerable divergence in the economic cycles of the
participating countries and the differences which persist in monetary transmission
mechanisms will make transparency, in particular, difficult to achieve in the short-run.
3 A Combined Target Monetary Strategy
In practice, considerable overlap exists between the ESCB’s candidate strategies of
monetary aggregate and inflation targeting.  Both pursue the same objective of price
                                               
13 Svensson (1997) argues that the inflation forecast is an ideal intermediate target where this variable
is easier to control and observe than actual inflation, and it facilitates the transparency of monetary
policy.9
stability, they are both forward looking and they both employ a wide variety of
indicators in determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy.  No monetary
authority has practised the pure form of monetary aggregate targeting.  The
Bundesbank, which has long championed monetary aggregate targeting, also monitors
a range of economic indicators on which it bases its policy decisions.  However, a
particular emphasis is placed on monetary aggregates in its public pronouncements.
14
Likewise, those countries that pursue an inflation target, in addition to a wide range of
economic and financial indicators, also monitor money aggregates in the assessment
and formulation of monetary policy actions. Therefore, since in practice neither
strategy is pursued in its pure form it is necessary to consider some combination of
these strategies.
In determining the appropriate target for monetary policy two main considerations
arise.  The first is the extent to which a stable and predictable relationship exists
between the intermediate target chosen and the final objective of price stability.  The
second is the degree to which the intermediate target is controllable by the monetary
authority.  In the context of the ESCB choosing a monetary strategy it is unlikely that
either an inflation targeting strategy or one focusing on monetary aggregates will
clearly dominate the other at the start of EMU.
The key challenge facing the ESCB will be the establishment of credibility with respect
to achieving its final objective of price stability.  Hence, it is particularly important that
whichever strategy is employed is accompanied by a high degree of transparency,
                                               
14 A number of studies have concluded that the actions of the Bundesbank are better described as
inflation targeting rather than monetary targeting (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1997, and Clarida and
Gertler, 1996).10
where the actions of the ESCB are communicated and explained to the public.
Balanced against the need for transparency in monetary policy actions there will be an
equally important need for flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy.  This is a direct
result of the high degree of uncertainty concerning the stability of economic and
financial relationships which will prevail at the start of EMU, arising partially from the
ensuing regime shift.  While the ESCB will want to maximise the credibility which
arises from adhering to a pre-specified strategy and communicating its actions within
that strategy, it will also need to incorporate a high degree of flexibility to cope with
unexpected monetary developments.  If flexibility is absent any credibility gained from
a specific strategy will be lost in the event of excessive deviations from its stated
target.
A strategy capable of delivering the flexibility required would be one that encompasses
elements of both inflation targeting and monetary aggregate targeting.  This hybrid
strategy could fall somewhere along a spectrum of options between ‘pure’ inflation
targeting and ‘pure’ monetary aggregate targeting (as outlined in Figure 2).  While it is
possible that the ESCB could opt not to announce any explicit intermediate target, so
allowing for maximum discretion in policy choice, this would diminish both
transparency and accountability.11
An alternative option would be to announce two intermediate targets, one for a
monetary aggregate and the other for forecasted inflation.  By allowing for some
discretion, this approach may overcome the problem that strict adherence to one target
rule may be overly restrictive when specific shocks arise.  However, the task of
ensuring that the pursuit of both targets remained mutually consistent would be
onerous.  In addition, the transparency of monetary policy decisions would be severely
impaired, exacerbated by the fact that it would significantly raise the possibility of
sending conflicting signals to both the financial markets and the public.
A more eclectic approach would involve two other hybrid options.  One of these
hybrid options would have a monetary aggregate as the intermediate target with the
inflation forecast as a principal indicator.  The other hybrid option would focus on the
























inflation forecast as the intermediate target and the monetary aggregate as a principal
indicator.  The principal indicator may take precedence over the intermediate target in
determining policy actions when a predefined set of circumstances occur.
The advantage of these options, combining an intermediate target with a principal
indicator, is that the strategy incorporates a mix of a simple rule with discretion.  This
is preferable to the monetary authority having complete discretion or adhering to a
fixed rule.
15  The issues raised in implementing these combined strategies are
considered in the next section.
4 Implementation of Monetary Strategies
The operational framework for the conduct of monetary policy in EMU has been
designed to be applicable to whatever strategy is finally chosen.  In designing this
framework the EMI have indicated that it should fulfil certain requirements to enable
the ESCB to carry out its tasks effectively.
16  Such requirements include that the
framework should provide the means through which the ESCB can control its
operating target;  monetary policy instruments should adequately and precisely enable
the ESCB to signal the stance of monetary policy; it should be capable of providing
and withdrawing liquidity, and influencing the structural position of the banking system
vis-à-vis the NCBs.
                                               
15 Meyer (1998) notes that “good policy should be systematic or rule-like, even when it is not formally
tied to a specific rule”.
16 For a more detailed analysis of the issues addressed in this section, see  EMI (1997a, 1997b).13
In attaining the ultimate target of price stability the ESCB will pursue a monetary
policy strategy as outlined above.  Depending on the strategy selected an intermediate
variable is targeted to overcome the difficulties associated with the length of the
transmission mechanism from monetary policy actions through to price stability.  This
target variable is attained through steering the operating target, which is currently
envisaged to be a market determined short-term interest rate.  In controlling the
operating target a range of monetary policy instruments and procedures are employed.
At this stage it is envisaged that the procedures and instruments which the ESCB will
have at its disposal will include open market operations, two standing facilities, and a
system of minimum reserve requirements.  This evolution of the stages of monetary
policy through to the ultimate target of price stability is outlined in Figure 3.  The
implementation issues which arise at each stage are discussed below.14










































4.1 Monetary policy instruments
The main operating target of the ESCB will, under normal circumstances, be a market-
determined short-term interest rate.  Open market operations will fulfil the function of
steering interest rates, controlling liquidity, and signalling the stance of monetary
policy.  In accordance with the principle of decentralisation the NCBs will play an
important role in implementing open market operations.  The main policy instrument
will be a two week repurchase transaction agreement (repo), executed on a weekly
basis.  This will be supplemented with a three month repo, fine tuning operations
(quick tender repos, foreign exchange swaps) and structural operations (issuance of
debt certificates, outright transactions).
Standing facilities will consist of a marginal lending facility and a deposit facility,
thereby providing an effective corridor for market interest rates which should limit the
volatility of these rates.  In complement to open market operations these standing
facilities will also fulfil a function in signalling the general stance of monetary policy.
17
While there is no consensus as to the desirability of minimum reserve requirements, it
is a distinct possibility at this stage that the counterparties of the ECB will be required
to hold reserves with the NCBs.
18  If employed minimum reserve requirements would
fulfil three functions:  where an averaging provision is included, financial institutions
are able to average their holdings of required reserves over the maintenance period and
                                               
17Given the depth of modern financial markets, which assimilate and respond to new information very
quickly, it will be important at the start of EMU that the ESCB clarifies to the market how to interpret
changes in rates determined or influenced by the ESCB.  This is necessary to avoid sending
conflicting or erroneous signals to the market.
18 While the selection of counterparties for monetary policy procedures has not been finalised, it is
envisaged that the ECB will generally be dealing with a very wide set.  It will probably include all the
banks in the EU, and possibly some non-bank financial institutions.16
hence money market interest rates are more stable; they either create or enlarge a
structural liquidity deficit thereby facilitating liquidity management
19; they tend to
increase the interest elasticity of money which is particularly relevant in the control of a
monetary aggregate.
The transmission of interest rate changes to economic activity is likely to differ quite
substantially between the member countries in the euro area.  This may be particularly
acute in the early stages of monetary union, which could make for difficult decisions on
the appropriate operating target level.  Recent research by Dornbusch et al. (1998) and
Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998) agree that output in the various economies have
different sensitivities to interest rate changes, although they disagree on the groups of
economies that most sensitive.
20
4.2 Candidate Monetary Strategies in Practice
The EMI has outlined a number of key features which will be part of any strategy
implemented by the ESCB, irrespective of the precise definition of the final strategy
chosen (EMI, 1997b).  These include:
•  the public announcement of a definition of price stability, which is currently
envisaged to be in a range of 0-2%;
                                               
19 In a study of the EU-wide structural position of the banking sector vis-à-vis the ESCB, Escriva and
Fagan (1996) conclude that a structural deficit will prevail which makes this function of reserve
requirements less important.  However, if there is a significant shift away from coins and banknotes
towards electronic payments in EMU then the ability of the ESCB to create or enlarge a structural
deficit could become increasingly relevant (Enoch et al., 1997).
20 Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998) find that the full effect of interest rate changes on output take twice
as long to occur but the impact is twice as big in a group of countries, including Austria, Belgium,
Finland, Germany and the Netherlands, in comparison to group including France, Italy, Portugal and
Spain.  In contrast the Dornbusch et al. (1998) study finds that the impact is greater and persists
longer in Italy than in both Germany or France, while the impact is much less in Spain compared to
these three countries.17
•  the setting of targets publicly such that the performance of the ESCB can be
assessed;
•  the monitoring of a broad set of indicator variables which offer relevant information
concerning future price stability;
•  the production of regular inflation forecasts and other general economic forecasts;
•  monetary aggregates should have a prominent role either through a publicly
announced target or monitoring range.
While differences persist between the various strategies in a theoretical context, these
differences are much less substantive in practical implementation.
21  Given that a wide
range of economic and financial indicators are monitored in both strategies, it is the
precise role assigned to these variables which serves as the main distinction.
Consequently, the communication of monetary policy intentions and actions to the
public depends on the strategy chosen.  It is this communication that influences
inflationary expectations and the credibility of the ESCB.
In the pursuit of a ‘pure’ monetary aggregate targeting strategy, a money aggregate
serves as an intermediate target.  The monetary authority publicly announces a
prespecified range for the growth in the targeted aggregate.  Monetary policy decisions
are then based on deviations of actual money growth from that targeted, where
monetary policy actions are explained to the public in the context of trends in the
monetary aggregate.
                                               
21 See Blinder (1998) for an excellent synthesis on the theory and practice of central banking
incorporating the perspectives of both academic economists and practising policymakers.18
In its purest form an inflation targeting strategy is defined as one which aims to target
inflation directly without the use of a specific intermediate target.  In this scenario the
monetary authority announces a target range for inflation which must be attained
within a given time horizon.  Where deviations arise between forecasted inflation and
the target value the monetary authority acts accordingly to restore inflation to its
predetermined path.  While the inflation forecast serves as an intermediate indicator in
this case, it can also be used more explicitly as an intermediate target variable in
itself.
22  A wide array of variables are employed in compiling the inflation forecast,
including monetary aggregates.  The communication of monetary policy actions to the
public thus involves explaining deviations in actual inflation from that targeted, but a
broader information base is utilised in doing so.
A hybrid strategy, as outlined in Section 3, incorporates a high degree of flexibility
enabling the monetary authority to respond in an appropriate manner to shocks as they
arise, without losing credibility due to missing the prespecified target.  For example,
the strategy may use a monetary aggregate as the intermediate target, but this could be
supplemented with an inflation forecast as a principal indicator.  In the event of a
destabilising shock to the monetary aggregate, the ESCB would switch to the principal
indicator in explaining its policy actions to the public.  In the opposite case with the
inflation forecast as the intermediate target, considerable uncertainty regarding the
inflation outlook would result in the focus of public communication switching to the
monetary aggregate.
                                               
22 One of the key limitations of an inflation targeting strategy is the observed difficulty in accurately
forecasting inflation (Cecchetti, 1995).  Furthermore, Issing (1998) notes that using an inflation
forecast as a target for monetary policy has implications for the accountability of the monetary
authority.  This is due to the complexity involved in the public’s assessment of monetary policy
actions in the context of the inflation forecast, as opposed to the actual inflation rate.19
It will be at the discretion of the ESCB to determine to what extent it wishes to pre-
empt its response to certain shocks.  This may involve either announcing a pre-
specified response or a switch to the principal indicator in the case of hybrid strategy.
This may enhance its credibility but at the expense of some flexibility.
4.3 Specification of Intermediate Targets/Indicators
Irrespective of the precise role assigned to either inflation or money in the monetary
policy strategy, the ESCB will have to assign relevant definitions to each variable.
Furthermore, the width of the target band will also have to be specified i.e. upper and
lower bounds within which inflation is targeted, as will the time horizon over which the
ESCB must attain the target.
•  Target/Indicator Variable
In choosing a relevant monetary aggregate to target there are certain “a priori
conditions” which must be met, such as liquidity in transactions and suitability for
deposits (EMI, 1997b).  Thereafter, the choice depends on the empirical properties of
the aggregate, such as its inherent stability and the extent to which the aggregate is
controllable by the monetary authority.
23  Table 1 presents a summary of the
guideline/indicator variables currently employed in the EU.
                                                                                                                                      
23 In response to financial innovation and the liberalisation of capital markets in the 1980s the
definition of money employed by various countries has changed.  Currently the Bundesbank and the
Banque de France focuses on a broad measure of money, M3.  In Spain a composite measure of
money, ALP, is monitored in conjunction with the inflation target.20
If the inflation variable was to assume a monitoring function in the ESCB, rather than a
target role, this would allow the ESCB some flexibility in the choice of an appropriate
index.  However, where a target range for inflation is announced then it is important
for the purposes of accountability that a specific index is chosen.  A suitable price
index in this instance is one which is timely, widely known and understood, and rarely
revised.  To-date retail price indices, adjusted for various components which are
viewed as either excessively volatile or which may be prone to supply shocks, have
been most popular in inflation targeting countries.  An alternative target which has
been suggested is the GDP deflator, due to the close links between this index and
potential output.  However, the deflator is little known, is published with a significant
lag, and is generally subject to significant revisions.  Finally, the availability of a
harmonised CPI (HICP) in the euro-wide area may prove to be an appropriate index
for the purpose of monitoring and/or targeting inflation.
•  Band Width
In choosing an appropriate band width for the target range, a trade-off arises between
a band that facilitates flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy and one which
maximises credibility.  A wide band allows the monetary authority considerable
flexibility in addressing shocks, but credibility may be diminished.  In contrast, a band
which is too narrow may result in excessive deviations from the target which also
diminishes credibility.  In this respect, the EMI has noted that the target range should
take account of the controllability of the target variable and its stability or otherwise.
2421
•  Time Horizon
The choice of an appropriate horizon within which the target is to be attained also
requires a balance such that it is neither too long or too short.  The long lags which
exist between monetary policy actions and their impact upon the final target,
necessitate that the horizon chosen is sufficiently long.  However, given that one of the
functions of a target is to lock-in inflationary expectations it must be sufficiently
current to be of relevance to decision makers.  In addition, if the horizon is too short,
the monetary authority may be forced to respond to shocks which may otherwise
dissipate in the long-run, in an effort to reach the target within the specified time
frame.
•  Public Communication of the Monetary Policy Strategy
The key distinction between the various strategies in the context of their practical
implementation is the extent to which different variables are prioritised in
communications with the public.  This communication with the public is critical to any
monetary policy strategy, where credibility is established and inflationary expectations
formed on the basis of how monetary policy actions are explained and presented.
Furthermore, communication with the public is necessary for transparency and
accountability purposes.
The ESCB will have to decide the manner and means by which it will explain its
decisions and actions to the public.  To-date the EMI have commented that the
publication of a target and details of its derivation would be desirable, in addition to
                                                                                                                                      
24 Where a range, as opposed to a point, for a target is chosen, it has been argued that inflation
expectations tend to focus on the upper bound of the range.  Hence, Finland has adopted a point for its22
explanations of deviations from the target and the policy responses of the ESCB.
However, it is yet to be decided whether or not the ESCB should publish its own
inflation forecasts.  While the publication of such forecasts enhances transparency, the
complexity involved in their estimation can impair the extent to which they are
comprehensible to the public.  Other difficulties arise such as the risk that published
inflation forecasts may influence wage and price setting arrangements, and the extent
to which financial market indicators used in the compilation of the forecast are
themselves conditional on the perceived stance of monetary policy.  Irrespective of
whether the actual inflation forecast itself will be published, the EMI has stated that
some form of publication regarding inflation developments and trends is also desirable.
                                                                                                                                      
inflation target, and in the UK and Sweden, a point is specified accompanied by a margin of +/- 1%.23
5 Conclusions
With most of the necessary elements now in place for EMU, the choice of monetary
strategy for the euro-area has yet to be decided upon.  The ESCB has been given a
clear objective of achieving price stability within EMU and the requisite independence
to pursue this goal.  The strategy for monetary policy in the euro area will have to
provide a transparent and coherent guide to policymaking in order to establish the
credibility of the ESCB.
The strategies under consideration have been narrowed down to monetary aggregate
and direct inflation targeting.  The distinction between these strategies is generally
overstated.  It can be argued that a monetary aggregate targeting strategy is a limiting
case of inflation targeting since the latter uses a wider array of information, including
money.  A simple choice between monetary aggregate targets and inflation targets
depends upon the predictability of the demand for money compared to the accuracy of
the forecasts of inflation.  However, due to the substantial restructuring of financial
markets in response to EMU, the money relationships necessary for monetary
aggregate targeting may become unreliable.  Likewise, the use of inflation targeting
will be hampered by the uncertainties introduced by substituting a single currency for
several currencies thereby rendering inflation forecasting more difficult.  These factors
make it unlikely that the ESCB will rely exclusively on either monetary aggregate
targeting or inflation targeting but rather on some combination of both.
Regardless of the strategy decided upon, the monetary framework will incorporate
certain key elements.  Such elements include the public announcement of a definition of24
price stability, the presentation of specific targets against which the ESCB’s
performance can be assessed, and the generation of forecasts of inflation and other
relevant economic variables.  In addition, the operational framework within EMU has
been designed to encompass whatever strategy is chosen.  It is envisaged that the
operating target will consist of a short-term interest rate, where the monetary policy
instruments used to steer this target will consist of open market operations, standing
facilities and possibly reserve requirements.
It is unlikely at the outset of EMU that the ESCB will be in a position to rely solely on
one strategy.  The most likely scenario is an eclectic one which combines elements of
both strategies.  Therefore, the choice may be either targeting monetary growth, while
placing major emphasis on actual inflation developments, or targeting inflation, while
giving a prominent role to money as an indicator.  The important distinction in deciding
on which target predominates lies in the presentation and communication of the policy
actions to the public.25
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